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Abstract
When Vladimir Umanets entered the Tate Modern on October 7, 2012
and defaced Rothko's Black on Maroon, he was operating, not as an
artist or a vandal, but as a Yellowist. Yellowism is neither art nor antiart but is instead a supposedly new cultural element that exists for its
own sake and is about nothing but the color yellow. It might be
tempting to write Yellowism and the Rothko defacement off as a mere
prank or as pseudo-intellectual fraud, but I argue that, intentionally or
not, the Yellowists have raised issues salient to those invested in both
the ontology of art and social ontology more generally. In particular,
their actions highlight issues pertaining to the relationship between
stipulation and ontology. I explore these issues in this paper.
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1. Introduction
On October 7, 2012, Vladimir Umanets (né Wlodzimierz Umaniec)
entered the Tate Modern and defaced Mark Rothko's 1958 Black on
Maroon, sloppily signing the work, dating it, and inscribing the phrase
“a potential piece of Yellowism.” After his subsequent arrest, Umanets
insisted that he was operating as neither artist nor vandal, but as a
Yellowist.[1] Yellowism, we are told, is neither art nor anti-art, but
something else entirely. Marcin Lodyga, Umanets's associate and fellow
Yellowist, described it as “an autonomous phenomenon of
contemporary culture,” distinct from but nonetheless “derived from the
visual arts.”[2] As one might predict, the Yellowists have not found
many sympathizers.
Should we regard Yellowism as a mere fraud? Are Umanets's actions
best regarded as nothing more than vandalism or as vandalism dressed
up in pseudo-intellectualism? Or have these Yellowists, intentionally or
not, raised questions relevant to the interests of philosophers of art, or
even to those of philosophers more generally? My goal here is to
make some progress on these questions.
Trading breadth for depth, I keep the scope of the discussion narrow.
The concept of Yellowism, the actions of the Yellowists, and the
surrounding controversies all make salient a number of issues well
worth discussing. We might ask questions pertaining to the nature and
ethics of vandalism, discuss the impact of Umanets's defacement on the
value (aesthetic, artistic, or otherwise) of Black on Maroon, inquire into
the subject of harm, assess critical and legal responses to the act, and
contest the Yellowists' claims that they are not making art. There is a
lot to explore, more than can be addressed in this paper. Instead, I
restrict my focus to issues of a more metaphysical nature, in particular,
to the ontological side of Yellowism.
It should be emphasized that, in putting aside discussion of the ethical
issues raised by Umanets’s actions, I do not mean to suggest that
those actions are in any way justified by the philosophical questions to
which they might point. They are, I think, clearly not justified by any
such potential insights.[3] That said, my primary aim here is to

examine the ideas of the Yellowists rather than the problematic and
destructive action through which Umanets drew attention to those
ideas.
In Section 2, I examine and interpret Lodyga and Umanets’s “Manifesto
of Yellowism.” In Section 3, I offer critical reflections on the Yellowists’
own attempts at justifying the defacement of Black on Maroon. In
Section 4, I explore a particularly salient issue raised by Yellowism,
looking closely at the relation between stipulation and ontology. In
Section 5, I conclude with remarks on the potential ontological
consequences of affording Yellowism the sort of attention, perhaps even
enfranchisement, discussed here.
2. The Manifesto of Yellowism
The ideas central to Yellowism are contained in Lodyga and Umanets's
“Manifesto of Yellowism.”[4] The Manifesto is presented in a manner
that suggests a division into four sections, each of which I discuss
below. Throughout, I remain charitable to the Yellowists, interpreting
their words and actions in a way that takes their intentions seriously.
Many philosophers have been skeptical of too strict an adherence to
such intentionalism; my goal, however, is to show that even within a
highly charitable framework, the claims of the Yellowists remain
problematic.[5]
The first section of the Manifesto contains a single, straightforward but
perplexing statement: “Yellowism is not art or anti-art.”[6] Yellowism
is therefore not to be understood as art, nor is it to be understood as
an intentional, contrary (or confrontational) reaction to art. Yellowists
are to be regarded neither as artists nor in opposition to artists, and
the pieces they create are to be classified neither as art works nor in
opposition to art works. While causally and historically related to art,
Yellowism is nonetheless something genuinely new. To be properly
understood and engaged with, it must be treated as such.
The Manifesto continues:
Examples of Yellowism can look like works of art but are
not works of art. We believe that the context for works of
art is already art. The context for Yellowism is nothing but
Yellowism. Pieces of Yellowism are not visually yellow,
however sometimes can be. In Yellowism the visibility of
yellow is reduced to minimum; yellow is just the
intellectual matter. Every piece of Yellowism is only
about yellow and nothing more, therefore all pieces of
Yellowism are identical in content – all manifestations of
Yellowism have the same sense and meaning and express
exactly the same. In the context of Yellowism, all
interpretations possible in the context of art, are reduced
to one, are equalized, flattened to yellow. Interpreting
Yellowism as art or being about something other than just
yellow deprives Yellowism of its only purpose. Yellowism
can be presented only in yellowistic chambers.[7]
The penultimate sentence strengthens the earlier point that, insofar as
the only purpose of an instance of Yellowism is to be a piece of
Yellowism, to interpret Yellowism as art is to do violence to the
concept. To define a piece of Yellowism as an art work, or to interpret
it as making a statement on art or some particular art work, is to
misunderstand and misrepresent the piece.
Though they are not art works, pieces of Yellowism resemble many art

works in that they have content: they are about something. Just as
Picasso's Guernica can be said to be about the horror of aerial
bombardment or Joseph Kosuth's One and Three Chairs can be said to
be about Plato's theory of forms, any piece of Yellowism is about the
color yellow and about only the color yellow. All pieces of Yellowism
essentially share this particular content: being exclusively about the
color yellow is a necessary condition for Yellowistic status.
By contrast, the physical properties of a piece are largely irrelevant to
its Yellowistic status. A piece could be yellow but it could also be any
other color, insofar as all that matters for Yellowistic status is what the
piece is about, not what it looks like.
Furthermore, a piece could exactly resemble an art work, though it
would likely differ from that art work with respect to aesthetic
properties. A piece that physically resembles Guernica would not, for
example, be disturbing or politically oriented since the possession of
such properties plausibly depends, at least in part, on content.
Guernica’s possession of such properties depends in part on the work
being about the horror of aerial bombardment; a piece of Yellowism
physically resembling Guernica would merely be about yellow, and
would thereby have no disturbing or politically oriented content with
which to ground the possession of such properties.
Further still, a piece could exactly resemble an art work both physically
and with respect to content, yet still differ aesthetically. If an art work
is about yellow, it might nonetheless manage to be insightful, clever,
innovative, or disturbing, depending on how that content is portrayed—
there are, after all, insightful (clever, etc.) ways of artistically
presenting the content yellow. A Yellowistic piece, however, would
likely possess none of these properties, as it would be just another
standard piece of Yellowism. It is hard to imagine how a piece could
succeed in being insightful, etc., when it has the same content as all
other pieces, and the manner of that content's presentation is
irrelevant.
While being about yellow is necessary for Yellowistic status, it is not
sufficient.   The manifesto states that pieces of Yellowism can be
presented only in yellowistic chambers, which means that any object
presented outside such a chamber is not a Yellowistic piece. Thus,
both content and manner of presentation are necessary,and, given the
lack of further specification in the Manifesto, jointly sufficient for
Yellowistic status.
These Yellowistic chambers are described next:
An yellowistic chamber is a closed room that is not an art
gallery and, because of its nature, cannot exist or be
presented as an art gallery. An yellowistic chamber
serves only to show pieces of Yellowism. Violet walls of an
yellowistic chamber are the only neutral background for
pieces of Yellowism.[8]
Extrapolating from this, we can reach the following analysis: for a
space to be a yellowistic chamber, it must (i) be a closed room, (ii)
have violet walls, and (iii) be used for the sole purpose of displaying
pieces of Yellowism.
No yellowistic chamber is an art gallery, and vice versa,: art works are
not pieces of Yellowism, and displaying an art work in such a a space
would be to use that space for some purpose other than displaying only
pieces of Yellowism, thereby violating (iii). An object's being presented

in such a chamber necessarily precludes that object from concurrently
enjoying art-work status: no objects outside of yellowistic chambers
are yellowistic, and no objects displayed in them are art works.
The Manifesto concludes with an illuminating contrast:
There is no evolution of Yellowism, there is only its
expansion. Art is forever developing< <diverse whole>
>. Yellowism is forever expanding< <homogeneous
mass> >.[9]
As Morris Weitz conjectured, art has a “very expansive, adventurous
character,” going through “ever-present changes” and offering us
“novel creations.”[10] These features led Weitz to the Wittgensteinian
conclusion that the concept art is an open concept, resisting definition
in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. Even if we reject
Weitz's conclusion, this expansive, adventurous, and dynamic character
is a datum any theory of art needs to accommodate to be even
minimally adequate.
Yellowism is of a different character. Rather than being expansive,
adventurous, or dynamic, its character is conservative, mundane, and
static, capable of no real changes and offering nothing by way of
novelty beyond that of the concept itself. Working within the WeitzianWittgensteinian idiom, the concept Yellowism is a closed concept,
readily admitting of definition through necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions: an object O is a piece of Yellowism if and only if O (i) has a
specific content [the color yellow], and (ii) is properly presented [in a
yellowistic chamber].
3. The transfiguration of the extraordinary
Despite his pseudonym being an anagram of “Im [sic] true vandalism,”
Umanets was insistent that his defacement of Black on Maroon was not
an act of vandalism.[11] “There was a lot of stuff like this before,”
Umanets said, adding that “Marcel Duchamp signed things that were
not made by him....”[12] So conceived, Umanets's actions are perhaps
of a kind with actions already familiar to the art world.
What Duchamp did with readymades such as Fountain and Bicycle
Wheel was, as Arthur Danto has put it, to “transfigure the
commonplace,” taking objects—urinals, bicycle wheels, and the like—
out of the commonplace realm of mere things and placing them into
the extraordinary realm of art.[13] By citing Duchamp as precedent,
Umanets suggests that, as a Yellowist, he should be understood as
expanding this familiar process: whereas Duchamp transfigured the
commonplace into the extraordinary, the Yellowists aim to further
transfigure the extraordinary into the Yellowistic.
It should be emphasized, however, that in defacing Black on Maroon,
Umanets did not succeed in transfiguring anything. Nor, for that
matter, did he attempt to: all that was attempted was to point out that
the work could be so transfigured. Even if we grant the legitimacy of
Yellowism as previously described, Black on Maroon remains an art
work, albeit a defaced one. It is not a piece of Yellowism, since it is not
being displayed in a yellowistic chamber nor has it undergone whatever
ritual might be required for its content to be appropriately reassigned.
By inscribing the phrase “a potential piece of Yellowism,” Umanets
merely pointed out that, were that object to be presented in a
yellowistic chamber and with whatever content-fixing ritual is required
to make it about yellow, Black on Maroon would cease to be an art
work and become a piece of Yellowism. Just as Duchamp ushered

commonplace objects through an ontological transfiguration into art
works (perhaps) by simply changing the context of their presentation
(and perhaps assigning content), so too could the Yellowists usher
extraordinary objects, such as Black on Maroon, through a further
ontological transfiguration, into pieces of Yellowism. Why Umanets
chose to make this point by sloppily inscribing a cryptic message on an
aesthetically, artistically, and culturally valuable art work enjoying a
seven-figure appraisal and which took a year and a half and almost
$300,000 to restore, rather than, say, with a sticky note, or simply by
pointing and declaring it so, remains a mystery.[14]
There are, however, important disanalogies between Duchamp's
transfigurations and Umanets's (potential) transfigurations. Duchamp
possessed, in some sense, dominion over the objects he transfigured
and, in cases in which he didn't, such as that of the Woolworth
Building, he is often taken to have failed in his attempt at
transfiguration.[15] To my knowledge, Duchamp also never attempted
to transfigure an original art work. The closest he came was perhaps
with L.H.O.O.Q. and L.H.O.O.Q. Shaved, both of which involved mere
copies of the original Mona Lisa, and with the case of the reciprocal
readymade, in which he suggested “[using] a Rembrandt as an ironing
board.”[16]   The latter, however, remained a mere thought
experiment. A potentially more apt comparison might be with
Rauschenberg's Erased de Kooning Drawing, though, again,
Rauschenberg had obtained de Kooning's permission to alter the work,
whereas Umanets received no such blessing from Rothko.
A more fitting precedent to Umanets's (potential) transfiguration might
be Yuan Cai and Jian Jun Xi's (collectively known as Mad for Real) 1999
“Anti-Stuckist” performance piece Two Naked Men Jump Into Tracey's
Bed in which the artists jumped into and wrestled around on the
unmade bed, partially constituting Tracey Emin's installation, My Bed,
despite lacking any permission from Emin to do so.[17] Even here,
though, there are potentially relevant disanalogies: Mad for Real
caused no costly damage to My Bed and, more to the point, they aimed
only to transfigure an existing art work into a component of a distinct
and further art work. Umanets's (potential) transfiguration, on the
other hand, is categorically different: it is (or would have been) the
transfiguration of an art work into something else entirely, a non-art
work piece of Yellowism.
Umanets's reliance on Duchamp's precedent, then, can only be taken
so far, since that precedent is, in the above respects, not the precedent
the Yellowists followed. Duchamp, Rauschenberg, Mad for Real, and
others have transfigured objects, sometimes ordinary, sometimes
extraordinary, into art works, working within the confines of the
established concept of art while still pushing the boundaries of that
concept. The Yellowists, by contrast, aim to transfigure objects,
sometimes ordinary, sometimes extraordinary, into pieces of Yellowism,
employing a concept with no establishment or pre-existing culture,
convention, or history, but instead merely stipulated into existence.
4. Ontology and stipulation
Given the amount of dismissive eye-rolling that often follows
descriptions of Yellowism, it is safe to say that, precedented or not,
many are simply unwilling to grant any sort of legitimacy to this
“movement” and would instead likely write it off as attention-seeking
prankery at worst, or at best as a hackneyed rehash of what Duchamp
and others have already done.[18] Even if Umanets were to place
Black on Maroon in a closed, violet room, and declare it to be about
yellow, most would likely maintain that he still would fail to create a

piece of Yellowism for the simple reason that there are no such things
as pieces of Yellowism.
I am inclined to agree, at least in part. Whereas Duchamp succeeded
(the case of the Woolworth Building notwithstanding) in transfiguring
the commonplace into the extraordinary, Umanets failed to point out
even a potential transfiguration of the extraordinary into the
Yellowistic. But it is exactly this failure, I submit, that makes Yellowism
philosophically and ontologically interesting. To be clear, the ontology
discussed here is not the fundamental ontology addressed in recent
work by many metaphysicians.[19] Rather than inquiring into the
nature of the basic building blocks of reality, the present discussion
focuses on the non-fundamental level of ontology typically of more
interest to those concerned with the ontology of art, and with social
ontology more generally. While vastly different enterprises, both enjoy
special significance.   Inquiry into fundamental ontology helps us
understand the very basic structure of reality (in Kit Fine's idiom, what
really exists) whereas inquiry into social ontology helps us understand
the properties, natures, and origins of entities and categories such as
races, genders, nations, elections, marriages, and art works, to give
just a few examples.
In Section 2, we arrived at a set of necessary and jointly sufficient
conditions for Yellowistic status: an object O is a piece of Yellowism if
and only if O (i) has a specific content [the color yellow] and (ii) is
properly presented [in a yellowistic chamber]. I submit that even if O
meets these conditions, O is still not a piece of Yellowism. Qualification
as a piece of Yellowism would take something more than just meeting
those stipulated conditions: it would require the further fact that piece
of Yellowism is a genuine kind of object. This “fact,” however, does not
obtain.
If piece of Yellowism were a genuine kind, it would presumably be what
we can follow John Searle and Amie Thomasson in calling an
“institutional kind.”[20] For a purported kind to really be a genuine
institutional kind, it needs more than merely an association with a set
of conditions. Status as a genuine, rather than merely ostensible,
institutional kind further requires some sort of collective recognition of
the purported kind as genuine.[21]   Searle illustrates this phenomenon
with the example of money:
...in order that the concept “money” apply to the stuff in
my pocket, it has to be the sort of thing that people think
is money. If everybody stops believing it is money, it
ceases to function as money, and eventually ceases to be
money. … For these sorts of facts, it seems to be almost a
logical truth that you cannot fool all the people all the
time. If everybody always thinks that this sort of thing is
money, and they use it as money and treat it as money,
then it is money. If nobody ever thinks this sort of thing
is money, then it is not money. And what goes for money
goes for elections, private property, wars, voting,
promises, marriages, buying and selling, political offices,
and so on.[22]
For Searle, institutional kinds are tied up with constitutive rules,
characteristically of the form “X counts as Y in context C.” If Y is a
purported institutional kind, an object O is a Y (in C) only if (i) O
satisfies the conditions for being an X, and (ii) we (in C) collectively
accept the constitutive rule that Xs count as Ys in C. If we do
collectively accept this rule, then Y is a genuine institutional kind; if
not, then not. A lack of acceptance precludes the existence of genuine

Ys, even if there are objects otherwise meeting the conditions for being
Xs.[23]
For Thomasson, to be an instance of an institutional kind K is to satisfy
the following condition:
IK-1: Necessarily, for all x, x is K if and only if there is a
set C of conditions such that it is collectively accepted that
(for all y, if y meets all conditions in C, then y is K), and x
meets all conditions in C.[24]
From IK-1, we can extract what it is for a purported kind to be a
genuine institutional kind:
IK-2: Necessarily, K is a genuine institutional kind if and
only if there is a set of conditions C such that it is
collectively accepted that (for all y, if y meets all
conditions in C, then y is K).
Continuing with Searle's example of money, we can determine that, by
IK-2, money is a genuine institutional kind in virtue of the fact that
there is a set of conditions C such that it is collectively accepted that
(for all y, if y meets all conditions in C, then y is money).
One might worry about the self-referential nature of these
characterizations. After all, for an object to be money it must meet
conditions collectively accepted to be such that meeting them is what it
takes for an object to be money. To assuage worries of vicious
circularity here, however, we can replace any reference to the kind in
question in its own conditions by a description of the role entities of
that kind play in a relevant practice. Instead of saying that something
is money just in case it meets certain conditions collectively accepted to
be such that meeting them is what it takes to be money, we can say
that something is money just in case it meets certain conditions
collectively accepted to be such that meeting them is what it takes for
an object to be able to appropriately fulfill this particular function.[25]
The notion of collective acceptance is crucial to Searle’s and
Thomasson's accounts, for it blocks the proliferation of new institutional
kinds by mere stipulation. Were it not for the role of collective
acceptance, it would be too easy to generate new institutional kinds by
simply defining them into existence. All one would have to do is
associate a lexical item that can ostensibly function as a kind term,
grammatically, with any arbitrary set of conditions. As Lynn Baker
points out, this is not how we tend to think that kinds work:
If I saw a piece of driftwood and made up the word
‘bonangle’ on the spot, and thought to myself, ‘It would
be nice if the world contained bonangles; I hereby make
that piece of driftwood a bonangle’, I would not have
brought into existence a new thing, a bonangle; our
conventions and practices do not have a place for
bonangles. It is not just thinking that brings things into
existence.[26]
Simply put: the driftwood does not become a bonangle because there
is no collective acceptance of the kind bonangle. Some of us might call
the driftwood a “bonangle,” of course, but it does not thereby become
a bonangle.
To drive the point home, we might repurpose Eli Hirsh's discussion of
incars and outcars, which we can here consider to be (potential)
institutional kinds characterized as follows:

An object O is an incar if and only if O is (i) a part of a
car, and (ii) inside of a garage.
An object O is an outcar if and only if O is (i) a part of a
car, and (ii) outside of a garage.[27]
Intuitively, merely defining these terms is not enough to bring into
existence such strange objects, and simply proposing such definitions
does not make it the case that “when a car leaves a garage, an incar
[gradually shrinks] and [vanishes], and [is] replaced by an outcar that
gradually grows.”[28] It seems sensible to say that, even if we might
coin such terms, there are no incars or outcars, because there is no
collective acceptance that meeting such conditions makes an object an
incar or an outcar. So, by the appropriate substitution of IK-2, neither
incar nor outcar is a genuine institutional kind. When it comes to
incars, the first conjunct of the right side of the bi-conditional in the
corresponding substitution instance of IK-1 fails to be satisfied, so
there are no such things. The same can be said for outcars.
Thus, as things stand in relation to what we collectively accept, no
object is potentially an incar or an outcar. Of course, facts about what
we collective accept are susceptible to change. We do not actually and
presently collectively accept incars and outcars but, as Searle points
out, “[one] way to create institutional facts [or objects] in situations
where the institution does not exist is simply to act as if it exists.”[29]
This suggests that, just as certain objects are money in part because
we started collectively acting as if they were money, those cars now in
our garages would become incars if we were to collectively act as if
they were. That is, if for whatever reason we were to adjust our
practices and begin to collectively accept that meeting such conditions
did grant an object incar status, then by the appropriate substitution
instance of IK-2, incar would become a genuine institutional kind. By
the corresponding substitution instance of IK-1, then, qualifying objects
would become incars.
There is a sense, then, in which certain objects are potentially incars.
If, over time, certain facts about what we collectively accept change,
then the currently merely ostensible kinds in question would develop
into genuine institutional kinds, and incars and outcars would thereby
come into existence.
As things actually and presently stand, piece of Yellowism seems more
like incar (or bonangle) than money. Some might choose to use the
words ‘piece of Yellowism’, just as some might choose to use ‘incar’ or
‘bonangle,’ but in doing so they would simply be introducing new
semantic labels for extant objects, a process which by itself would bring
about no ontological (even social ontological) shift in any objects. To
actually be a piece of Yellowism (or an incar, etc.), rather than just be
called such, not only must the object meet the conditions discussed
earlier, but there must be some collective acceptance that objects
meeting such conditions are pieces of Yellowism (or incars, etc). And,
actually and presently, there simply isn't. To be clear, I am not
offering any precisification of the notion of collective acceptance.[30] I
take it, however, that on any plausible precisification, sufficiently
collective acceptance of the purported kind piece of Yellowism would
take much more than acceptance just by the current circle of Yellowists
(to my knowledge, just Umanets and Lodyga), especially when that
small sum of acceptance is weighed against the forceful lack of
acceptance seen in the reactions to Yellowism expressed by many,
perhaps most, who encounter the concept.[31]
There is a sense, then, that the Yellowists, in merely stipulating their

definition of Yellowism, have done nothing to bring such objects, or
even the potential for such objects, into existence. In this sense,
Umanets's inscription is misleading: Black on Maroon is not “a
potential piece of Yellowism,” since nothing is. As things actually and
presently stand, piece of Yellowism is not a kind to which any object
could belong because it is not a genuine kind at all.
Recall, though, Searle's point about creating institutional objects and
kinds by collectively acting as if they exist. This suggests that, as with
incars and perhaps bonangles, if we were to begin to collectively act,
consciously or not, as if piece of Yellowism were a genuine institutional
kind, it would become one and, with that, Black on Maroon would
become a potential piece of Yellowism. Insofar as the purported kind
piece of Yellowism is a potentially genuine institutional kind, there is a
sense in which Black on Maroon is, actually and presently, a potential
piece of Yellowism: it is a potential instance of a potentially genuine
kind, an (actually and presently) merely ostensible kind which would
become genuine were we to start acting differently. Perhaps, then, the
best thing to say is that Black on Maroon is a potential potential piece
of Yellowism.
This latter kind of potential, the potential for the kind to become
legitimate, is realized only alongside sufficient collective acceptance of
the purported kind. Discussions in which Yellowism is taken seriously
(perhaps including this one) play some role in institutionally legitimizing
Yellowism, even if only slightly. Thus, to borrow and modify another
phrase from Danto, we see a potential “philosophical enfranchisement”
of Yellowism, in two senses.[32] First, we see a philosophical
enfranchisement of the Yellowists’ ideas, in that we are attending to
philosophical issues such ideas make salient. Second, we see a
potential philosophical enfranchisement of Yellowism itself insofar as, by
seriously engaging with the concept, we push it ever so slightly forward
toward a legitimacy which, once obtained, comes with the consequence
that Black on Maroon really could become a potential piece of
Yellowism.
5. Ontological consequences
One might argue that, even if piece of Yellowism were legitimized as a
genuine institutional kind, Black on Maroon would still not be a potential
piece of Yellowism. As we saw in the Manifesto, an object cannot
simultaneously be an art work and enjoy Yellowistic status. Even if
piece of Yellowism becomes a genuine institutional kind, Black on
Maroon will still fail to be a potential piece of Yellowism for the very
reason that it is already an art work.
If so, then the Manifesto of Yellowism seems to contain consequences
unforeseen by its authors. Since pieces of Yellowism require yellowistic
chambers, and a room is a yellowistic chamber only if it is used to
display only works of Yellowism, then displaying an art work like Black
on Maroon in such a room would negate its status as a yellowistic
chamber, thereby further negating the Yellowistic status of all of the
other pieces on display inside. Even if Yellowism were to become so
enfranchised, we might be able to make use of extant art works as a
reliable sort of Yellowism repellant.
While these claims might have merit, they also come with the charge
that Umanets and Lodyga have misunderstood the concept that they
themselves defined in their Manifesto. As discussed in Section 3, the
Yellowists clearly see themselves as taking objects out of one category,
art work, and into another, piece of Yellowism. They take themselves
to be transfiguring the extraordinary or, at least, pointing out a

potential transfiguration. This potential transfiguration, however, would
be trivially impossible on the above understanding. If we are
comfortable ascribing such a conceptual blunder to the inventors of the
concept itself, our job here may be done, and perhaps, in the end, that
is just what we should do. But again, leaning more toward being overly
charitable rather than not charitable enough, what if we were to
attempt to understand Yellowism in the way its creators most plausibly
intended?
So understood, Yellowism manages to reach outside of itself. Put more
precisely, say that a kind K is ontologically revisionary just in case (i)
being a K is incompatible with being an instance of a distinct kind K';
and (ii) it is possible for a K' to become a K. The kind adult is
revisionary in that (i) being an adult is incompatible with being a minor,
and (ii) it is possible for a minor to become an adult. For ontologically
revisionary kinds, the shift from K'-hood to K-hood negates the
object's K'-hood, just as the shift to being an adult negates a person's
status as a minor.
Yellowism is ontologically revisionary: being a piece of Yellowism is
incompatible with being an art work, and on the Yellowists’ apparent
understanding, it is possible for an artwork to become a piece of
Yellowism. Thus, were Black on Maroon to become a piece of
Yellowism, it would cease to be an art work. If the name 'Black on
Maroon' essentially denotes an art work (perhaps conceived of as an
object constituted by, yet distinct from, the painted canvas), then, in
losing its status as an artwork, that object would fail to survive the
transfiguration into a piece of Yellowism. The canvas itself would
become a piece of Yellowism, assimilated into the “forever expanding <
< homogenous mass > >,” while Black on Maroon would be
destroyed.[33]
If we were to collectively accept the Yellowists’ conditions, thereby
granting piece of Yellowism status as a genuine, albeit ontologically
revisionary, institutional kind, we would be creating new possible
contexts in which the art work status of any given art work could easily
be dissolved. Collective acceptance of Yellowism, then, poses a threat
insofar as it has the potential to lead to the loss of particular art
works. Individual instances of the ontological import of long-standing,
highly engrained conventions—such as art—thus turn out to be quite
fragile, capable of being nullified by the mere collective acceptance of
arbitrarily defined institutional kinds that, in the present sense, manage
to reach outside of themselves.[34]
This observation helps us understand why the limited collective
acceptance of piece of Yellowism by the Yellowists is not collective
enough for granting institutional legitimacy onto the ostensible kind.
When a potential kind K is ontologically revisionary, assessments of
collective acceptance of K must take into account not only the
acceptance of K by those who have proposed it, but also the extent to
which K is collectively accepted by those who also collectively accept
other kinds the instances of which are in a position to undergo
ontological revision should K become institutionally legitimized. That is,
the Yellowists would be successful only if their ideas became accepted
by the relevant art world public, or alternatively, if that art world public
were to grant them an entitlement to make certain decisions on its
collective behalf, such as the people of the United States have with the
U.S. Mint and decisions regarding certain matters of coinage.[35] As
things actually and presently stand (though still merely contingently),
both of these scenarios are far from the case.
I conclude somewhat paradoxically: in light of these potential

philosophical enfranchisements of Yellowism, the best defense against
this potentially destructive ontological revision is to simply let the
Yellowists be lost to history. If we are to discuss them, we ought to
remain vigilant in our skepticism.[36]
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